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The paper argues that the structure, derivation and evolution of syntax is given by the sequence (elements, concatenation, embed-
ding). We discuss the implications of this sequence for language and the numeral system in general and on the evolution of language
in particular. A four-stage model of the evolution of syntax, broadly compatible with several earlier scenarios, is proposed. The four
stages are (1) signs, (2) increased number of signs, (3) commutative concatenation, and (4) noncommutative concatenation. We support
the model by showing that its stages can be adaptive per se, which could explain why they evolved. We also identify two preconditions for
maintaining the stages: stage (2) depends on the ability to conceptualize asymmetric relations between concepts and the adaptiveness of
stage (3) depends on cultural constraints on linguistic interpretation.
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Although the capacity for language is part of our genetic
endowment, language is, essentially, a technological inno-
vation, and one that rather evolved to ﬁt the brain than
vice versa (Christiansen & Chater, 2008; Doumas & Hum-
mel, 2005). In modelling language evolution, the following
scenario is widely agreed upon:
preadaptations ½1 ! protolanguage ð! preadaptations ½2?Þ
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Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.Certain preadaptations [1] were necessary for protolan-
guage to emerge. Anatomical preadaptations included
changes in the brain anatomy; anatomical preadaptations
for speech included changes in middle and/or inner ear
anatomy, an enhanced thoracic innervation and a re-con-
ﬁguration of the tongue and vocal tract (Boe¨ et al., 2007;
Fitch, 2000; MacLarnon & Hewitt, 1999; Martı´nez et al.,
2004; Wynn, 1998). Depending on one’s theoretical stand-
point, cognitive preadaptations could have been, e.g., the-
ory of mind and relational reinterpretation (Call &
Tomasello, 2008; Penn, Holyoak, & Povinelli, 2008; Penn
& Povinelli, 2007). As protolanguage is, essentially, a lan-
guage without syntax, it refers to either a holophrastic or
arbitrarily concatenated language. Although culturally
downgraded, both of these variants are exceedingly com-
mon in natural communication, e.g. in ellipsis, simple dia-
logues and giving orders. In fact, sentences are frequently
diﬃcult to identify in spoken discourse (Bowie, 2008).
Although there are substantial structural diﬀerences
between protolanguage and syntactic language, the main
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tic form constrains interpretation better than in protolan-
guage, otherwise the expressive powers of the two
variants are comparable. For example, it has been pro-
posed that the diﬀerence between protolanguage and syn-
tactic language is roughly of the order of that between
pidgin and creole (Bickerton, 1990; Givo´n, 1998). In any
case, protolanguage would have been suﬃcient to support
all these properly symbolic or symboling-dependent activi-
ties discussed in Section 2. As to why protolanguage was
eventually substituted with syntactic language, the most
plausible explanation is that the transition reduced ambi-
guity and facilitated interpretation. It is unknown whether
it was a solely technological innovation or required some
additional anatomical and cognitive preadaptations [2].
However, see Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch (2002) and
Chomsky (2010) for the proposal that the preadaptations
included a neurally implemented recursion. In linguistics,
there is a sharp diﬀerence between historical (up to
10 000 years) and evolutionary (10 000 to millions of years)
timescales. There is no concept of ‘languages’ contiguous
to present day natural languages for the evolutionary time-
scale. As protolanguage pertains to the evolutionary time-
scale, it is cross-linguistically universal by deﬁnition. In the
following sections, we propose a novel, universal and par-
simonious model of the evolution of syntax, substantiate it
and show the adaptiveness of its stages.
2. The evolution of syntactic compositionality of language
Martin A. Nowak and colleagues have established a
mathematical framework for modeling the evolution of
language based on evolutionary game theory (Nowak,
Komarova, & Niyogi, 2001; Nowak & Krakauer, 1999;
Nowak, Plotkin, & Jansen, 2000). Nowak and Komarova
speak of ‘compound signals’: “Word stems /—/ of human
languages are elementary signals, but phrases, sentences or
any syntactic structures in human languages represent
compound signals” (Nowak & Komarova, 2001, p. 290).
Compound signals imply relations between the concepts
that they refer to. In natural language, the generic principle
for compound signals is asymmetric dependency1 (head-
dependent, stem-aﬃx, modiﬁed-modiﬁer, main-subordi-
nate clause, etc.). Thus, the conceptualization of asymmetric
relations between concepts (CARC) is a cognitive prerequi-
site for language. From the viewpoint of CARC, the fol-
lowing statements are equivalent: concept A depends on
concept B, A is caused by B, A contains B, A includes B,
B belongs to A, B is a part of A, etc. The simplest kind
of representations we regard as concepts are secondary rep-
resentations in the sense of Perner (1991): cross-modal
mental models capable of representing past, future, or
imaginary objects or events, or representing the representa-1 Incidentally, this also provides clues as to language evolution and
change. As a rule of thumb, the necessary components antedate their
dependents (cf. Budd, 2006).tional content of other representational systems. According
to Perner (1991, p. 7), secondary representations are dis-
tinct from (and intermediate between) primary representa-
tions and metarepresentations.
In addition to relating two concepts asymmetrically,
CARC enables conceptual compositionality (e.g. father =
male parent, 2 = 1 + 1, etc.) and semantic embedding
(explained in the next paragraph). The adaptivity of CARC
lies in an increase in the ability to plan one’s behavior
owing to the conceptualization of asymmetric relations
governing the physical world. The eﬀects of CARC include
the conceptualization of containment hierarchies of
depth 2 and more, causality, deﬁnitions, the concepts of
knowledge and ownership, etc. The possibly uniquely
human semantic synthesis ability, proposed by Dessalles,
is also an eﬀect of CARC. In describing protolanguage,
Dessalles (2008, p. 56) gives the following example of
semantic synthesis: “Listeners must integrate the diﬀerent
associations triggered by the diﬀerent words, ‘stranger’,
‘plain’, ‘ﬁre’ into one single state of aﬀairs, instead of imag-
ining several disconnected situations”. Not only syntactic
(clauses) but also morphosyntactic (inﬂected words) and
discourse pragmatic (discourse context) devices are
compound signals that subsist on CARC. It should be
noted though that while clause and discourse are almost
always compound (imply semantic embedding), phrases
and word forms are frequently elementary. Thus we have
to discern at least these four levels of semantic embedding
(cf. below).
However, a compound signal is not the ﬁrst step
towards syntax. Concatenation is necessarily a compound
signal only from the viewpoint of modern syntax. A proto-
syntactic concatenation lacks at least two features charac-
teristic of modern syntax: grammar and semantic
embedding. We deﬁne semantic embedding as follows: a
meaningful linguistic unit in another meaningful linguistic
unit, e.g. a phrase in a phrase, a word in a phrase, a word
in a sentence, a word in a discourse, a morpheme in a word,
etc.2 A protosyntactic concatenation of any two signals A
and B (e.g., dog run) is not a compound signal (in this case,
a putative sentence), just two signals concatenated. It is
only after extensive (and eventually, grammatically con-
strained) use that AB becomes a compound signal. Diessel
and Tomasello (2005) have found that initially children use
verbs like think, know, see exclusively in ﬁrst person, pres-
ent tense, never negated. Instead of embedding, this seems
to be concatenation of a ﬁxed form (I know/think/see) with
a sentence. Similarly, in Jackendoﬀ’s (1999, p. 273) model
of steps in the evolution of language, concatenation pre-
cedes the “use of symbol position to convey basic semantic
relationships”, which implies grammar and embedding (cf.
Dessalles, 2006; Johansson, 2006). Thus, we arrive at
Table 1.2 By syntactic embedding is usually meant the subcase of semantic
embedding that operates on phrases and sentences.
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stages of syntactic compositionality, [. . .] marks a precondi-
tion for maintaining the stage. The stages are ordered ver-
tically with each stage describing a state of syntactic
compositionality achieved (e.g., ‘concatenation of signs’).
Table 1 is hierarchical, i.e. at each stage the conditions stip-
ulated by the previous stages (above them) apply as well.
This accords with the evolutionary principle of building
on rather than expunging the earlier stages. The timing
of the stages is relative, i.e. the intervals between them
might not be equal. According to this scale, two major
steps in the evolution of syntactic compositionality are
1) from isolated signs to concatenated signs and 2) from
concatenated signs to embedded signs. ‘Signs’ refer to dis-
tinctly meaningful signs – probably symbols but this is not
so clear for the earlier stages (1)–(3), which might have had
predominantly iconic or indexical signs (e.g. in gestural or
vocal-gestural modality – Bickerton, 2003; Steels, Kaplan,
McIntyre, & Looveren, 2002). An increased number of
signs is attested as a prerequisite of language and a payoﬀ
condition for compound signals (Christiansen & Kirby,
2003; Jackendoﬀ, 1999; Nowak & Komarova, 2001).
We assume that the ability to conceptualize asymmetric
relations between concepts is a precondition for maintain-
ing stage (2) (increased number of signs). CARC is implied
by the concepts that subsume asymmetric relations, e.g.
‘inﬂuence’, ‘cause’, ‘result’, ‘kill’, ‘throw’, ‘heal’, ‘eat’, etc.
As signs for such concepts cannot appear before the ability
to entertain the concepts themselves, CARC is a prerequi-
site for a vast number of signs. As predicates, these signs
are more complex than simple arguments (tree, man, etc.)
and one-place predicates (sleep, run, etc.), i.e. they could
be evolutionarily later additions to the vocabulary (cf.
Heine & Kuteva, 2007; Luuk, 2009). At the same time,
CARC is not a suﬃcient condition for stage (2). Thus,
though this is certainly plausible, it is not a priori clear that
all species that are unable to attain stage (2) would lack
CARC.
By free concatenation we mean commutative concatena-
tion, i.e. concatenation of elements regardless of their suc-
cession. Cultural constraints on linguistic interpretation
(CCLI) are required for stage (3), free concatenation, for
the latter to contribute to the individuals’ ﬁtness (see below
and Sections 3.1, 4). For example, in kill man rat, did a rat
kill a man or vice versa? Our present CCLI suggest that it
was probably the man who did the killing. CCLI are auto-
matically evoked in the contexts where interpretation isTable 1
The evolution of syntactic compositionality of language.
(1) signs
#
(2) increased number of signs [CARC]
#
(3) free concatenation of signs [CCLI]
#
(4) grammar  constraints on concatenation of
signs  semantic embeddinglinguistically highly underspeciﬁed (in modern language,
the speciﬁcation is done by grammar). A relative freedom
of concatenation is implied by the second payoﬀ condition
for syntactic communication “the compound signals must
be able to encode the relevant messages in such a way that
individual components occur in many diﬀerent messages”
(Nowak & Komarova, 2001, p. 291). Nevertheless, the free-
dom must be constrained by interpretation, either by CCLI
(as in protolanguage) or by CCLI and grammar, otherwise
coherent communication cannot emerge (cf. Jackendoﬀ,
1999; Nowak & Krakauer, 1999). Conversely, the need of
grammar arises only if communication about many diﬀer-
ent events is required – a language must have more relevant
sentences than words (Nowak & Krakauer, 1999; Nowak
et al., 2000), which in turn presupposes a relative freedom
of concatenation. CCLI are implicit, whereas grammar
provides explicit constraints for linguistic interpretation.
From this, one can conjecture that the need for grammar
arises when CCLI become inadequate.3 This condition is
met under the following circumstances: large group sizes,
high levels of intragroup diversity, a growing need for
intergroup communication or intragroup specialization. It
is easy to observe that all these parameters indicate social
sophistication.
3. Background
3.1. Evolutionary context
One of the best proxies for culture is a recording of the
group’s experience on an external storage. As the forms
and meanings of (proto)linguistic signs are shared by con-
vention, both language and protolanguage count as exter-
nal storage. Of course, as compared to written language,
spoken and signed languages are ephemeral external stor-
age that depends more on memory. Hence the possible sig-
niﬁcance of rhythm and melody as additional mnemonic
cues for (proto)language. Observe also that a combination
of sound and gesture, as in normal face to face discourse,
provides more mnemonic cues than the discourse that is
either exclusively signed or spoken (as it exhibits signal
redundancy – which partly explains our automatic ten-
dency to gesture while talking). As protolanguage is an
external storage, culture either antedates protolanguage
or is contemporaneous with it. Theoretically, a prelinguis-
tic external storage could have made use of non-linguistic
symbols or non-symbolic signs (i.e. icons and indices).
Observe that, unless they follow distinctive and elaborate
styles, the shapes of functional artifacts (e.g. tools) are3 Hurford (2010, p.c.) referred to the theoretical alternative that
language becomes decorated with grammar as a badge of group identity.
This is less plausible because a badge of group identity can be virtually
anything (from handaxe to handshake style) whereas explicit constraints
for linguistic interpretation are a narrow superset of grammar. Moreover,
as the explicit (both lexical and grammatical) constraints are usually
unique, they provide a badge of group identity for free.
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to the tool material vs. task problem than an external stor-
age of group’s experience (cf. Wynn, 1991, 2002). The ﬁrst
signs of culture in this sense are mode 2 tools from
1.65 mya4 (Klein, 2000). Mode 2 tools appear within the
time frame for the earliest circumstantial evidence for lan-
guage (which, in all likelihood, was a protolanguage). This
evidence includes Homo erectus’ successful colonization of
much of the Old World (from Africa and Western Europe
to Java, China and, possibly, Central Siberia) and its adap-
tation for enhanced vocalizations as compared to austra-
lopithecines (Ascenzi, Benvenuti, & Segre, 1997; Asfaw
et al., 2002; Bar-Yosef & Belfer-Cohenb, 2001; Gibbons,
1998; Larick et al., 2001; MacLarnon & Hewitt, 1999;
Meyer, 2003; Meyer, Lordkipanidze, & Vekua, 2006;
Waters, Forman, & Pierson, 1997). The evidence also indi-
cates that, by 0.8 mya, H. erectus had crossed substantial
stretches of open water (at least 19 km) in Indonesia (Mor-
wood, O’Sullivan, Aziz, & Raza, 1998). In sum, the circum-
stantial evidence brackets the emergence of
(proto)language between 0.8 and 2.3 mya. The latter date
corresponds to the appearance of Homo habilis, the ﬁrst
known Homo species (Kimbel, Johanson, & Rak, 1997).
As H. habilis is the direct ancestor of H. erectus (Spoor
et al., 2007), and a species that was not scrutinized by
MacLarnon and Hewitt (1999), it is possible that H. habilis
was anatomically adapted to speech as well (see Tobias,
1998).
In natural language, grammar, constrained (i.e. non-
commutative) concatenation of signs and semantic embed-
ding are coextensive. Unless we are dealing with a purely
phonological (e.g. Vowel First) constraint, noncommuta-
tive concatenation is an asymmetric relation between
meaningful units (signs), which in turn entails semantic
embedding. As any asymmetric relation between meaning-
ful units A and B (usually a head-dependent relation) stip-
ulates a higher-order meaningful unit A–B, we have
semantic embedding (a meaningful unit in another mean-
ingful unit). Conversely, semantic embedding entails two
levels of meaningful units, the boundaries of which can
be given (over serial channel) only by concatenation. Over
serial channel, embedding entails concatenation (e.g.
[B[A]B] subsumes concatenate [B + A + B]).
From what we know, a primitive grammar might have
had any of the following rules: the noun/verb distinction,
Agent First, Focus Last, grouping, and noun-noun com-
pounds (Jackendoﬀ, 1999). All these rules imply semantic
embedding and noncommutative concatenation. In mod-
ern language, semantic embedding (or noncommutative
concatenation, here marked by [   +   ]) constitutes the
levels of the following grammatical units5: word [run + s],4 Mode 1, appearing 2.5 mya (Klein, 2000), is essentially an ape-grade
technology (Wynn, 1991).
5 Discourse is not a grammatical unit because there is a consensus
(articulated by, e.g., Meillet and Bloomﬁeld – Graﬃ, 2001, p. 1843) that
the sentence is the largest unit of grammar.phrase [a + man], and clause (both relative and main
clause, e.g. [[a + man] + [run + s]]). It is possible to have
multiple phrasal embedding, as in [[[[John’s] + -
mother’s] + cat’s] + tail], and multiple clausal embedding,
e.g. [He met the writer + [that the man + [who was ill] + had
seen before]]. All these rules are stipulated by grammar. Of
all the syntactic units (phrase, morphological word, relative
and main clause), the sentence or main clause is communi-
catively the most fundamental. There is hardly any need for
phrases before there is a sentence, and there is not much
need for morphology before syntax. Although morphology
is used to make semantic distinctions (one/many, male/
female, etc.), its main function is to serve syntax in argu-
ment, predicate, and argument-predicate relation marking
(Luuk, 2009). Thus, the ﬁrst syntactic unit was probably
functionally equivalent to a sentence. There would be more
than one possibility for this. Given the availability of
semantically diverse stem categories, the simplest solution
would have been to concatenate arguments and predicates,
as in [man go]. Alternatively, with a categorially uniform
stem choice, a solution would have been to concatenate dif-
ferent semantic roles, as in [man forest], interpreted as ‘man
go to forest’. Due to the opacity of interpretation the sec-
ond possibility seems less likely but, as the categorial con-
tents of the set of input stems is not known, the more
plausible scenario cannot be established with certainty.
The general principle of grammar is the head-dependent
relation, i.e. the principle of asymmetric dependency. Thus,
grammar and semantic embedding presuppose CARC.
Grammar and semantic embedding are inconceivable with-
out CARC, whereas the latter is perfectly conceivable with-
out language, grammar and semantic embedding. As
CARC is prelinguistically useful (e.g. in planning), there
is a fair chance that it antedated language.
Interfaces to phonology and semantics aside (Hauser
et al., 2002; Jackendoﬀ, 2002; Nowak & Komarova, 2001),
the three building blocks {signs, concatenation, embedding}
are all that is required for syntax – any syntax can be built
(and described) with them6 – while some of them are redun-
dant in describing pre-syntactic stages. Noncommutative
concatenation of signs yields the head-dependent relation
for free (see above). Observe that one cannot speak of natu-
ral language syntax until stage (4) is achieved. Natural lan-
guage syntax is qualitatively diﬀerent from the raw syntax
of other species (e.g. birds) communication systems in being
semantically compositional (Gardner, Naef, & Nottebohm,
2005; Hurford, 2004). Given the accounts that apes and dol-
phins can be trained to learn symbols and understand prim-
itive sentences in captivity, a proﬁciency seemingly
pertaining to at least stage (3), it is puzzling that, to the pres-
ent knowledge at least, they have developedno stage (3) com-
munication system in the wild (Herman, Richards, & Wolz,6 In some languages (e.g. Dutch) there is an intermediate condition
between concatenation and embedding – cross-dependency (Christiansen
& Chater, 2003). For instance, N1N2V1V2 is an example of cross-
dependency between N1V1 and N2V2.
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explanation that has been proposed to this curious inapti-
tude to commune is a lack of motivation (Bickerton, 2003;
Seyfarth,Cheney,&Bergman, 2005; Szamado&Szathmary,
2006). Indeed, the degree of communication that gets
rewarded in human societies is much higher than that of
among other primate species (Knight, 2002). Yet, there is
no doubt that our ancestors were once in the same situation
the other primates are now. Thus it is unlikely that a lack of
motivation could be a suﬃcient explanation for all, as Bick-
erton puts it, “relatively large-brained species” (Bickerton,
2003, p. 83). On the more technical side, Nowak et al. have
some other possible explanations (Nowak & Komarova,
2001). Certain conditions have to be met before natural
selection can see the advantages of compounding: 1. The
total number of relevant messages has to exceed a critical
value, 2. The compound signals must be able to encode the
relevant messages in such a way that individual components
occur inmany diﬀerentmessages. Plausibly, these conditions
are not met by non-humans. But why? We hypothesize that
the degree of diﬀerentiation of conceptual structure in non-
humans is insuﬃcient to support these conditions. Speciﬁ-
cally, there seems to be something unique about the human
capacity for hierarchical conceptualization (but it is diﬃcult
to tell what exactly – see Chomsky, 2010; Dessalles, 2008;
Fauconnier & Turner, 2008; Hauser et al., 2002; Luuk &
Luuk, 2008; Penn & Povinelli, 2007; Penn et al., 2008; Pre-
mack & Woodruﬀ, 1978; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007;
Tomasello, Call, & Hare, 2003; Tulving, 2005, for diﬀerent
hypotheses, some of which appear to be already falsiﬁed –
Correia, Dickinson, & Clayton, 2007; Osvath, 2009).
Curiously, only one possible example of a semantically
compositional syntax, the extremely limited communication
system of honeybees,7 is found in non-humans in the wild,
and no clear example of semantically compositional commu-
nicationhasbeen found in non-humanvertebrates (Hurford,
2004; Michelsen, 1999; von Frisch & Lindauer, 1996). There
are bird songs, cetacean songs, and primate ‘long calls’ built
up out of smaller units, but the units are not meaningful on
their own, and/or diﬀerent combinations are not distinc-
tively meaningful (Jackendoﬀ, 1999; Ujhelyi, 1998). This
argument applies also to the special case of putty-nose mon-
keys (Arnold&Zuberbuhler, 2006). Thesemonkeys produce
two calls, ‘pyows’ and ‘hacks’ in response to, mainly, leop-
ards and eagles, respectively. The researches found that the
monkeys also produce a third call, ‘pyow–hack’ (P–H),
and observed that P–H triggers group movement. In addi-
tion, although the putty-nosed monkeys sometimes move7 In honeybees’ waggle dance, the direction of the dance encodes the
direction to the food source relative to the sun’s azimuth in the ﬁeld, and
the velocity of the dance encodes the distance to the food source
(Michelsen, 1999). However, this does not imply semantic composition-
ality, as it is not clear whether honeybees interpret the direction and the
velocity of the dance as the direction and the distance to the food source,
respectively. It is possible that they interpret the whole dance as the
location of the food source, i.e. they might not recognize the two elements
in the dance as meaningful on their own.through the canopy to escape from an approaching leopard,
this strategy is avoided when threatened by large raptors, as
it would increase the risk of attack. Leopard growls were
played back to 17 diﬀerent monkey groups. In nine groups,
the male produced call series containing at least one P–H.
The researchers found that, 20 min later, the groups whose
males had produced P–H had traveled signiﬁcantly farther
than other groups. It is important to note that P–H is not a
semantic combination, and complies with P and H due to
loud call repertoire constraints only (Arnold, p.c.). Elemen-
tary signals must retain their reference within a compound
for the latter to be a semantic combination. First, it is not evi-
dent that P and H have retained their reference in P–H. Sec-
ond, themonkeys’ behavior would seem irrational if P andH
had retained their reference, as movement is avoided when
threatened by large raptors (H), as it increases the risk of
attack.
3.2. Comparison with earlier approaches
Although the evolution of syntax has been of consider-
able interest to researchers, there are surprisingly few expli-
cit models. This section compares our model with those
explicit models and/or general approaches that are more
compatible with Table 1.
Bickerton (1998) subscribes to a scenario with stages (1),
(3) and (4), omitting (2). His scenario is more general than
Jackendoﬀ (1999), which proposes a detailed model. The
diﬀerences between Jackendoﬀ’s and our model are follow-
ing. (a) Our model is more universal: where Jackendoﬀ
speaks of ‘symbols’, we have ‘signs’; Jackendoﬀ’s stages
“use of symbol positions to convey basic semantic relation-
ships” and “hierarchical phrase structure” are subcases of
semantic embedding, i.e. conﬂated in our stage (4). (b) In
Jackendoﬀ’s model, there is no link between “use of an
open, unlimited class of symbols” and “concatenation of
symbols”, corresponding to our stages (2) and (3)–(4) that
are linked both evolutionarily and derivationally. (c) In his
model, the distinction between commutative and noncom-
mutative concatenation is implicit rather than explicit.
Nowak et al. (Nowak, 2000; Nowak & Krakauer, 1999;
Nowak et al., 2000, 2001) do not analyze language evolu-
tion into an explicit succession of stages. However, the fol-
lowing stages can be inferred: phoneme-object pairs (1),
increased number of words (2), grammar (the word types
N and V) (4). As such, their model omits stage (3). Notice
also the diﬀerence between ‘phoneme-object pair’ and
‘word’ – not all words are phoneme-object pairs (both
are conﬂated under ‘sign’ in our model). Johansson
(2006) oﬀers an explicit model, one concerned mainly with
the evolution of grammar from stage (4) onwards. His
model misses both stages (2) and (3). Finally, Dessalles
(2006, 2008) comes closest to Table 1 using diﬀerent termi-
nology and without an explicit model. He has ‘words’
where we have ‘signs’ and ‘(non)commutativity’ is never
mentioned. Concepts like ‘semantic embedding’, CARC
and CCLI are unique to our model, although there are sim-
8 About 125 year ago, Alfred Russel Wallace posed the paradox that
“the gigantic development of the mathematical capacity is wholly
unexplained by the theory of natural selection, and must be due to some
altogether distinct cause“, if only because it remained unused (Chomsky,
2010).
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ability. Also, Dessalles (2006, p. 149; 2008, pp. 55, 61) pre-
sents (2) as a possibility (with references to Nowak et al.)
rather than a necessary stage.
4. The evolution of syntactic compositionality: adaptiveness
of the stages
Roughly, the correlates of the evolution of syntactic com-
positionality of language are the following: 1. The number of
rules describing the set of signs increases. 2. The number of
cues for distinct interpretations increases. 3. The ambiguity
of interpretation decreases. Grammar implies full syntax,
while stages (1)–(3) are necessary compositional prerequi-
sites for grammar. In addition, stage (4) (grammar) is a posi-
tive criterion for deﬁning language and a negative criterion
for deﬁning protolanguage. We point out that irrespective
of whether the evolution of language was gradual (Hurford,
2012; Newmeyer, 1991; Pinker & Bloom, 1990) or cata-
strophic (Bickerton, 1995, 1998; Chomsky, 2010; Rossello´,
Alba, Martin, & Borrega, 2012) there is no reason to single
out one stage as protolanguage. Thus, stages (1)–(3) roughly
correspond to what Bickerton and Jackendoﬀ call protolan-
guage (Bickerton, 1990; Jackendoﬀ, 1999, 2002).We assume
that all stages in Table 1 are adaptive per se (otherwise it
would not be clear why they should have evolved). The traits
that contribute to ﬁtness are far more likely to be selected for
than those that do not. Still, it may be hard to see how could
one beneﬁt from free concatenation before the emergence of
grammar (see Table 1).
Beforewe can answer this question,wehave tomake some
assumptions about stages (1)–(3). It is logical to presume that
in the beginning there were no distinct word types, and it is
plausible that the ﬁrst words met the condition that agents
must have parallel non-verbal ways (e.g. pointing) to achieve
goals of interactions (Steels et al., 2002). As the noun/verb
distinction stipulates a primitive grammar and syntax, there
was by deﬁnition no noun/verb distinction before grammar
(i.e. in stages (1)–(3)). Further, as noun/verb is themost basic
distinction among word types both comparatively and prag-
matically, and the one that shows remarkable complemen-
tarity (Nowak & Krakauer, 1999; Sole, 2005), there were
plausibly no distinct word types before the noun/verb dis-
tinction (Heine & Kuteva, 2002, 2007; Luuk, 2009). Stage
(3) could contribute to ﬁtness only insofar as it relied on con-
straints on interpretation, otherwise coherent interpretation
could not have emerged. The constraints were provided by a
relevance criterion. Depending on the context, diﬀerent sets
of relevance criteria might have been evoked, e.g., logical
possibility, pragmatic or ontological feasibility, direct and/
or inferential unexpectedness and/or emotionality (Dessal-
les, 2008), etc. However, having constraints on interpreta-
tion is not enough – minimally, coherent communication
requires consistent and shared constraints on interpretation.
Cultural constraints on linguistic interpretation (CCLI) gen-
erally satisfy these conditions. By CCLI we denote the prag-
matic, logical and ontological constraints that are notimposed on a linguistic expression grammatically or lexically
but are necessary to narrow down its interpretation. CCLI
are enhanced by cooperation and small group size.Members
of small groups and coalitions know each other well and face
similar situations, but even then, the unambiguity of CCLI is
limited. In order to maximize consistency and sharability,
constraints on linguistic interpretation had to be external-
ized. This is precisely the motivation for syntax to evolve,
and constitutes the transition from stage (3) to (4) (from
commutative to noncommutative concatenation).
As for the putative concatenations at stage (3), relying
solely on CCLI to be understood, consider the following
example. Wolf stone or stone wolf, uttered by X to Y in
the presence of wolves and stones, might be readily under-
stood as a suggestion to throw stones at wolves, assuming
that X and/or Y have behaved similarly before and have
(roughly) the same interpretations for stone and wolf. Cru-
cially, Wolf stone / stone wolf is interpreted as a compound
expression by CCLI alone, and does not presuppose any
syntactic constraints (i.e. grammar). But is speaking adap-
tive in a situation like this? It would have been more eﬃ-
cient if X just threw stones at wolves and Y imitated X.
If the common goal is present in the actual environment,
the collaborators need not focus on a joint representation
of it before acting (Gardenfors, 2004). However, suppose
that X has access to stones and Y does not. Then, if X
did not start stoning wolves by himself, it would have made
sense for Y to say wolf stone. Ga¨rdenfors is arguably cor-
rect: the pragmatic aspects of language are the most funda-
mental from an evolutionary point of view. It is obvious
that this kind of communication, though limited, could still
contribute to ﬁtness (cf. Jackendoﬀ, 1999; Jackendoﬀ &
Pinker, 2005). Of course, verbal communication would be
as likely in situations where immediate action is not
required and participants have enough time to commune.
Then, stone wolf or wolf ﬁeld might inform X that Y stoned
wolves or saw them on the ﬁeld earlier. Similar examples
can be found in, e.g., Bowie (2008) and Dessalles (2008).
Our conclusions about the utility of CCLI can be
divided into two parts. 1. CCLI are suﬃcient for the inter-
pretation of complex expressions only insofar as they are
consistent and shared, two conditions that are enhanced
by cooperation and small group size. 2. The interpretation
of complex expressions at stage (3) relies on CCLI alone, as
opposed to CCLI and grammar at stage (4).
5. Language, number, and numeral
For a long time, at least since the posing of Wallace’s
paradox,8 it has been speculated that the mathematical
capacity is an oﬀshoot of the language faculty. According
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derivative of language. It seems to be an established fact
that exact arithmetic – and, hence, the cognition of N – is
mainly dependent on language-speciﬁc representations
(i.e. the verbal number concept – Dehaene, Spelke, Pinel,
Stanescu, & Tsivkin, 1999; Nieder, 2005; Wiese, 2003).
For example, exact calculation tasks are dependent on left
inferior frontal activation that is also involved in verbal
association tasks (Dehaene et al., 1999; Petersen, Fox, Pos-
ner, Mintun, & Raichle, 1988; Vandenberghe, Price, Wise,
Josephs, & Frackowiak, 1996; Wagner et al., 1998). Simi-
larly, aphasia following left-hemispheric brain damage
tends to be associated with a selective impairment in exact
arithmetic in contrast to approximate numerical judgments
which depend on viso-spatial networks (for details, see
Dehaene et al., 1999; cf. Monti, Parsons, & Osherson,
2012).
As both systems represent over serial channel, there are
also certain structural similarities between language and
the numeral system. Most importantly, the set {elements,
concatenation, embedding} describes both systems. How-
ever, our numeral systems are structurally more complex
than natural language, as they stipulate concatenation
and embedding for each digit. In (unary, binary, decimal,
hexadecimal or other – depending on the notation) point
representation, numerical embedding can be depicted
graphically by [. . .[x3[x2[x1]]]].[y1[y2[y3[. . .]]]], where x’s are
integral and y’s are fractional digits. In both systems, the
elements are signs (i.e. form-meaning pairs) – meaningful
linguistic units in language and numerals in the numeral
system. Both numerical and semantic embedding are non-
commutative: [1[2]] – [2[1]] and [run + s]– *s + run. How-
ever, the constraints that stipulate numerical and semantic
embedding are very diﬀerent. In positional notation, a suc-
cession of digits reﬂects their magnitude, but there is no
universal principle of succession of meaningful linguistic
units. The universal magnitude constraint on concatena-
tion stipulates numerical embedding, much like grammati-
cal constraints on concatenation stipulate semantic
embedding. Thus, in both systems, embedding is stipulated
by constraints on concatenation. In sum, there is evidence
of the same elementary cognitive operations underlying
language, number, and the numeral system.
6. Discussion
Embedding and concatenation are the general rules of
structuring – viz., those of inward and outward expansion,
respectively. In models of language evolution, there has
been only one proposal of the inward expansion antedating
the outward one. This proposal, now largely dismissed
(Bickerton, 2003; Johansson, 2008; Sundquist, 2012; Tall-
erman, 2007), is that of a holistic protolanguage by Wray
(1998, 2000). Wray’s proposal was that holistic utterances
of protolanguage were, in the advent of syntax, fractured
into distinct words. The main counterargument to this,
supported by Johansson’s (2008) calculation, is that thestructure of the holistic utterances would have been too
ambiguous to yield distinct form-meaning pairs (i.e. words)
for the fractioning. Thus, the alternative hypothesis, that of
the initial outward expansion by concatenation, would
have to be true.
Both modern language and the numeral system have
constraints on concatenation that stipulate noncommuta-
tive embedding (semantic and numerical embedding,
respectively). However, the constraints themselves are dif-
ferent. The observed numeral systems obey the universal
magnitude constraint, but there is no universal constraint
on concatenation in language. Instead, linguistic concate-
nation is constrained by grammar, i.e. language-speciﬁc
noncommutative concatenation. Thus, there is evidence
of the same compositional capacity underlying language
and the numeral system.
The structure, derivation and evolution of language is
given by the sequence (elements, concatenation, embed-
ding). This sequence is both derivational and evolution-
ary, as each member of the sequence has the one(s) to
its left as its logical and evolutionary prerequisite(s).
Arguably, the sequence is the general principle by which
language is structured and evolved. Starting with a lim-
ited set of signs, it then expands the set, ﬁrst by concat-
enating and, in later stages, also by embedding the signs.
With the support of Jackendoﬀ (1999), Nowak et al.
(2000), Diessel and Tomasello (2005), Johansson (2006)
and Dessalles (2006), we arrive at the following four-
stage evolutionary scale of syntactic compositionality:
(1) signs, (2) increased number of signs, (3) commutative
concatenation of signs, (4) grammar (noncommutative
concatenation of signs), resulting in semantic embedding
(initially, words in phrases and sentences). The scale is
hierarchical, i.e. at each stage the conditions stipulated
by the previous stage(s) apply as well. We show how
all these stages can be adaptive per se (which could
explain why they evolved), and argue that CARC and
CCLI are preconditions for maintaining stages (2) and
(3), respectively. A principal trait of the scale is its scope:
up to the emergence of grammar. Diﬀerently from e.g.
Dessalles (2006), Jackendoﬀ (1999), Johansson (2006),
we do not model stages beyond (4). Implications for
ontogeny should not be taken as granted but our model
predicts that children’s inventory of elementary verbal
signs (not necessarily words, as children may confuse
phrases with words) must grow to reach a certain size
before the concatenation starts. The model also predicts
a (possibly unstable) stage of commutative concatenation
preceding the noncommutative one.
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